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The Crisis of the Industrial City
and the Invention of Juvenile Justice
Solomon J. Greene*
In the country or in the country town, if the boy invades the
watermelon patch or the apple orchard, the neighbor can inform
the father and the father can deal with the boy in the cellar or
the barn in his own peculiar way. In the city the situation is
entirely different.
-Juvenile Court Judge Ben B. Lindsay'
J.D. candidate, Yale Law School. I am grateful to Eric Cummins and Karen Sawislak for
inspiring this research and Professors Anita L. Allen-Castellitto and Robert Gordon for their
thorough comments and thoughtful advice. This Note was greatly enhanced by Matthew Fagin
and the editors of the Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, who challenged me to ground
my historical musings within the context of ongoing debates about juvenile
justice.
1. Ben B. Lindsey, Additional Report on Methods and Results, in INT'L PRISON
COMM'N, CHILDREN'S COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THEIR ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT,
AND RESULTS 47,93 (Samuel J. Barrows ed., 1904).
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I. INTRODUCTION: CRISIS IN THE STREETS
At the end of the nineteenth century, Chicago, like many
American cities, was experiencing a crisis in the streets. During the
nineteenth century, Chicago grew more rapidly than any other city.2
Chicago in the 1840s was a village of about 5000 people; by 1900 it
was a booming metropolis of 1,500,000. 3 Foreign immigrants fueled
this wave of growth, accounting for seventy percent of Chicago's
population by 1890.' An ever-increasing social divide formed
between a small group of wealthy, native-born citizens who
controlled the political and business establishment in the city and
the vast majority of poor, immigrant families. Due to the labor
demands of the industrial economy, overcrowding, and changes in
household composition, youth were increasingly displaced from the
domestic sphere.' No longer confined to the home, urban youth
took to the streets for employment, recreation, and social
interaction.
Chicago in the nineteenth century experienced what historian
John Kasson has termed a "semiotic breakdown,"7 with poor
children epitomizing the failure of the industrial city to sustain
traditional, idealized forms, such as the pastoral family. As a
contemporary child-saver declared, "[c]hildren should deal with
elemental things of the world-earth, stones, trees, animals,
running water, fire, open spaces-instead of pavements, signboards,
subdivided lots, apartment houses, and electric percolators."8
According to Jane Addams, the 882,000 children in Chicago at the
turn of the century constituted "a huge city in themselves."9
Addams observed that these youth were no longer governed by the
traditional authority of the family or other social institutions:
"[T]he present disordered situation demonstrates that adequate
protection is not secured through the solicitude of parent, the
sectional activity of educators, the self-interest of employers nor
the profit-seeking of pleasure purveyors."'" Nor did existing legal
2. See ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 37
(2d ed. 1977).
3. See THOMAS J. BERNARD, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 84 (1992).
4. See id.
5. See idat 84-85.
6. See ELIZABETH J. CLAPP, MOTHERS OF ALL CHILDREN: WOMEN REFORMERS AND
THE RISE OF JUVENILE COURTS IN PROGRESSIVE ERA AMERICA 31 (1998).
7. JOHN F. KASSON, RUDENESS AND CIVILITY: MANNERS IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
URBAN AMERICA 70 (1991).
8. Miriam Van Waters, The Juvenile Court from the Child's Viewpoint, in THE CHILD,
THE CLINIC, AND THE COURT 217, 221 (Jane Addams ed., 1925).
9. Jane Addams, Preface to LOUISE DE KOVEN BOWEN, SAFEGUARDS FOR CITY
YOUTH AT WORK AND AT PLAY, at vii, viii (1914).
10. Id.
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institutions, grounded in English common law and ripe for
modernization, adequately serve this city of children in the
industrial era."
Out of this crisis emerged a hope for change. The juvenile court
movement was launched in the 1890s in order to address the
"problem" of urban youth. The perceived breakdown of the
traditional family and rise of the "broken home" required a
redefinition of the role of the courts in shaping the behavior of the
city's street children; indeed, it was considered "impossible to
obtain any possible standards of public morals unless there [were]
well-considered legal provisions."' 2 In response to this crisis, the
Illinois legislature passed the Juvenile Court Act of 1899,"
establishing the nation's first juvenile court in Cook County. The
philosophy espoused in the original juvenile court was that a child
who broke the law was to be dealt with by the state, not as a
criminal, but as a child needing care, education, and protection.
The logic of the court was apparently simple: "[I]t is wiser and less
expensive to save children than to punish criminals."" (See Figure
1). The Cook County juvenile court provided the "adequate
protection" that Jane Addams and other progressive reformers
insisted was lacking in the "modern city."
Much of the literature on the early juvenile courts suggests that
this new institution was created as a necessary reform that
effectively removed children from the adult criminal justice system
and treated youth in a more humane and holistic manner.'5 Under
the rule of law ideal, this innovation can be read as a progressive
refinement of the legal authority of the state, a careful delineation
11. See Preston Elrod, Similarities in Conservative and Liberal Juvenile Justice Policies.- Is
There a Critical Alternative?, in CUTTING THE EDGE: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES IN
RADICALJCRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 165, 174 (Jeffrey Ian Ross ed.,
1998).
12. BOWEN, supra note 9, at 8.
13. Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Ill. Laws 131. Thd Act contained the following key
features: 1) It established distinct procedures and developed a separate court for children
under age sixteen who were alleged to be delinquent, neglected, or dependent; 2) it gave
probation officers investigatory and supervisory powers over juveniles; 3) it prohibited
detention of a child under age twelve; and 4) it required that adults and juveniles be
separated when housed in the same facility. See WILLIAM A. KURTZ & PAUL C. GIANELLI,
OHIO JUVENILE LAW 9 (3d ed. 1994).
14. T.D. HURLEY, JUVENILE COURTS AND WHAT THEY HAVE ACCOMPLISHED, at
cover (2d ed. 1904). This slogan was previously adopted as the motto of the Boys and Girls
Aid Society, founded in 1874. See James Flamant, "Child-Saving Charities in This Big Town,"
S.F. MORNING CALL, May 28, 1893 atwww.zpub.com/sf5O/sf/hgcsc.htm.
15. See. e.g., PLATT, supra note 2, at xv (arguing that Progressive Era reform
movements, such as the juvenile court movement, are typically treated by historians and
criminologists as "fundamentally benevolent, humanitarian, and gradualist"). For a
traditional account, see HERBERT LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2
(1927). For a more modern account, see Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr., Reassessment Should Not
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between criminal law and family law, youth and adult, punishment
and rehabilitation. 6 And while many academics,17 policymakers,18
and even judges 9 have recently called for the reform or dismantling
of the juvenile justice system, even the harshest critics often suggest
that the court originated as a benign, pro-family, and pro-child
intervention that has somehow degenerated over time into a
dangerous anachronism, a humanitarian dream unfulfilled.
Feminist historians and legal scholars who decry the juvenile
court's current gendered biases simultaneously celebrate the
court's origins as a victory for female reformers in the nineteenth
century.2
Closer analysis of the historical record reveals that these views
are misguided. The juvenile court was never particularly benign,
especially for working class women and children. As this Note
argues, it was invented precisely-although perhaps not
explicitly-as a means of surveillance and control over the lives of
working class and immigrant families. The juvenile court system re-
entrenched social and class difference and reinforced middle-class
fears about a burgeoning lower-class population in the industrial
16. The concept of a separate judicial system for juvenile offenders has taken root in the
late twentieth century as a critical component of international "rule of law" reforms. See
generally Roger J.R. Levesque, Future Visions of Juvenile Justice: Lessons from
International and Comparative Law, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1563 (1996) (describing the
various international mandates regarding juvenile justice). The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, adopted in 1966, urges states to separate juvenile offenders from
their adult counterparts, adopt different trial procedures for juveniles, consider the
juvenile's age, and promote rehabilitation for youthful offenders. International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, arts. 10(2)(b) & 14(4), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 176-77
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). See also United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
the Administration of Juvenile Justice, G.A. Res 40/33, U.N. GAOR, 40h Sess., Supp. No.
53, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985) [hereinafter Beijing Rules], (offering principles to
guide the development of juvenile justice systems); Convention on the Rights of the Child,
G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44' Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989)
(incorporating the Beijing Rules into treaty form and obliging nations to consider children's
best interests and take into account an individual child's evolving capacity in developing
independent juvenile justice systems). At the same time, the heightened judicial discretion
and "individualized" sentencing central to the original juvenile court model has been
criticized as contrary to the rule of law ideals of stability and transparency. See infra notes
76-80 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the
Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C.L. REV. 1083 (1991); Barry
C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court. Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing
Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997).
18. See, e.g., Naftali Bendavid, Congress Poised to Mandate That More Youths Be
Charged-and Punished--as Adults, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 14, 1997, at 1 (describing several
proposals to radically alter the juvenile court system to allow more youth to be tried in adult
courts).
19. See, e.g., Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There
Still a Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 57 (1992) (proposing extended
commitment laws that would keep dangerous juveniles off the street until rehabilitated,
regardless of age, and a reduction of the shield of confidentiality that has traditionally
surrounded the juvenile justice system).
20. See, e.g., CLAPP, supra note 6.
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city. This "innovation" utilized a scientific discourse on
"delinquency" and "adolescence" emerging at the end of the
nineteenth century, and codified the social hierarchies contained in
this discourse. The goals of "rehabilitation" so lauded by
contemporary reformers merely provided a cover for the state to
expand its jurisdiction over poor families, demonstrating how the
"rule of law" can function in unspoken ways to patrol the existing
social order at the expense of equality, due process, and privacy
rights.
In order to examine critically the construction of juvenile justice
in late nineteenth-century Chicago, this paper utilizes Michel
Foucault's notion of "power-knowledge" and the strategies of
surveillance and discipline that produce the categories of
"normalcy" and "delinquency." 2' This Note situates the juvenile
court as a mechanism of power-knowledge that undermined family
autonomy, or, using the terminology of Jacques Donzelot,
constituted a "gradual 'transfer of sovereignty' from the 'morally
deficient' family to the body of philanthropic notables."22 I contend
that in order to understand why the juvenile court has failed to live
up to its progressive ideals, it is necessary to look at how the ideal
itself was flawed from the outset. Rather than furthering the
seemingly benign goal of "treating the child as a child,"23 the
juvenile court movement was driven by an obsessive desire to
monitor, regulate, and discipline working-class and immigrant
communities in the industrial city.
The ways in which the juvenile courts sought to order the
industrial city are considered here by looking at three interlocking
themes: law, gender, and science. In Part II, I consider the shifts in
family law that occurred simultaneously with the increasing
breakdown of the pastoral home as a realizable ideal. In Part III, I
consider how gendered notions of charity enabled the expansion of
the juvenile courts into the homes and neighborhoods of working-
class and immigrant families. In Part IV, I examine the scientific
underpinnings of the court's jurisdiction over delinquent youth.
Finally, in Part V, I discuss how this historical analysis of the
juvenile court can inform current debates over the legitimacy of the
court and destabilize some of the assumptions underlying
contemporary forms of social control over urban youth. In order to
illustrate these points, I rely on academic and legal literature
21. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 27-28
(Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1st ed. 1977)
22. JACQUES DONZELOT, THE POLICING OF FAMILIES 83 (Robert Hurley trans.,
Pantheon Books 1st ed. 1979).
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produced during the early years of the juvenile court system, a
period in which the court was "old enough to have an experience
and young enough to have a future.'24
II. DOCTRINAL CONTEXT:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF PARENS PATRIAE
The urban crisis of the late nineteenth century occurred at the
same time that courts in the United States were grappling with the
extent of their jurisdiction over youth and families. In particular,
conflicting decisions regarding the limits of state intervention into
family affairs created anxiety over the ability of the existing court
structure to remedy juvenile delinquency. Contemporary case law
had restricted the nineteenth-century criminal court's jurisdiction
over non-offending urban youth on due process grounds. Such case
law conflicted with widespread middle-class fears about the
breakdown of the pastoral family ideal. The juvenile court was
devised largely as a legislative means of bypassing these judicially
recognized due process rights for children and, thus, constituted a
radical expansion of the court's ability to intervene in the lives of
working-class and immigrant urban families.
In order to trace the origins of the juvenile court system and the
particular legal context in which it emerged, it is necessary to begin
with the case of Mary Ann Crouse. In 1838, Crouse, the child of
working-class parents, was committed by a Philadelphia justice of
the peace to the Philadelphia House of Refuge,25 not because she
had committed any offense, but because she "appeared to be in
danger of growing up to become a pauper."26 Her father objected to
the court's action, raising the question: Can a criminal court
intervene in domestic affairs when no crime has been committed?
In its landmark ruling in 1839, Exparte Crouse,2 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court responded that, in fact, it could:
24. Samuel J. Barrows, Introduction to INT'L PRISON COMM'N, supra note 1, at ix, x.
25. The "house of refuge" was a nineteenth-century institution that provided residential
"treatment" for both delinquent and impoverished youth. Children committed to houses of
refuge were either convicted of crimes or simply "pauper children" who were "committed as
vagrants." See Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae: From Chancery to the Juvenile
Court, in JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY 58, 66 (Frederic L. Faust & Paul J. Brantingham
eds., 1979). Although a discussion of the house of refuge movement is outside the scope of
this paper, it is worth noting that the house of refuge was seen as an "alternative to the
poorhouse" and was among a spectrum of state responses to juvenile poverty. See id. at 70-
74. For a detailed history of the house of refuge movement and its links to the juvenile court
movement, see generally ROBERT S. PICKETT, HOUSE OF REFUGE: ORIGINS OF JUVENILE
REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE, 1815-1857 (1969).
26. BERNARD, supra note 3, at 68.
27. Exparte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839).
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The House of Refuge is not a prison, but a school.... The
object of the charity is reformation ... by separating [the child]
from the corrupting influence of improper associates. To this
end, may not the natural parents, when unequal to the task of
education, or unworthy of it, be superseded by the parens
patriae, or common guardian of the community? ... The infant
has been snatched from a course which must have ended in
confirmed depravity; and, not only is the restraint on her person
lawful, but it would be an act of extreme cruelty to release her
from it.28
The court maintained the legality of Crouse's detention by
asserting that she was being helped, not punished, and by utilizing
the state's role as parens patriae, or "father of the country."
The concept of parens patriae was established in the chancery
courts of sixteenth-century England and was originally applied in
cases where parents had died intestate, leaving an estate that the
court managed until the child turned twenty-one. 9 In the absence
of natural parents, the state, acting as the parent of the country,
could claim parental authority. The Crouse case was the first time
that the concept of parens patriae was extended to justify statutory
commitments.3 ° Ironically, the Crouse decision made poverty a
central concern: The issue was not how to deal with the estate of
deceased parents, but how to deal with the lack of estate of living
parents. As Judge Lawrence Koontz recently remarked, the only
"crime" for which Mary Ann Crouse was committed was "being
poor." 1 Courts in the nineteenth century, like the one in Exparte
Crouse, consistently held that the state does not need to provide
procedural safeguards when it is acting as parens patriae.
Thirty years later, the Illinois Supreme Court considered a
similar case, but reached a contrary conclusion, in People ex rel.
O'Connell v. Turner.3 In Turner, the court found that the state
exceeded its power as parens patriae when it committed a fourteen-
year-old boy to a reform school without specific allegations of
28. Id. at 11-12.
29. See BERNARD, supra note 3, at 69.
30. See Rendleman, supra note 25, at 68.
31. See Koontz, supra note 15, at 183.
32. See Sacha M. Coupet, What To Do with the Sheep in Wolf's Clothing: The Role of
Rhetoric and Reality About Youth Offenders in the Constructive Dismantling of the
Juvenile Justice System. 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1303, 1309 (2000); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile
Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1205 (1970); see also
Kathleen S. Bean, Changing the Rules: Public Access to Dependency Court, 79 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1, 25 (2001) (describing Crouse as the doctrinal source for later decisions upholding
the reach of the Poor Laws and the juvenile courts into the lives of poor families).
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misconduct.34 The court asked, "why should minors be imprisoned
for misfortune?, 35 and held that statutory commitments of
children, absent criminal conduct, violated formal due process
protections, regardless of the benevolent goals of the court."
Justice Thorton, writing the opinion of the court, observed that
"[t]he parent has the right to the care, custody, and assistance of his
child. The duty to maintain and protect it is a principle of natural
law.... The municipal law should not disturb this relation, except
for the strongest reasons."37 The court found that the ability to
confine a child for a period of many years to be "tyranny and
oppression. If, without crime, without the conviction of any offense,
the children of the State are to be thus confined for the 'good of
society,' then society had better be reduced to its original elements,
and free government acknowledged a failure."3
The Turner case stands as "one of the first judicial recognitions
of the constitutional due process rights of status offenders subject
to loss of liberty."39 At the same time, the court's holding in Turner
severely restricted the power of the courts to detain poor children,
and halted the expansion of the parens patriae doctrine in Illinois.
By the 1890s, the "child-savers" of Chicago's women's clubs, aid
societies, and religious organizations were anxious to find a way
around this decision and to reinstate parens patriae in their crisis-
ridden city." Creative solutions were needed.
In response to widespread lobbying from middle-class women,41
the Illinois legislature passed the Juvenile Court Act in 1899,
establishing the nation's first juvenile court system in Cook
County.42 Under the Act, the juvenile court retained jurisdiction
over all neglected, dependent, and delinquent children.43 In order to
circumvent the objections raised in the Turner case, the juvenile
court was established as a chancery, rather than criminal, court and
defined itself as a reformatory, non-punitive institution." This
solution proved to be incredibly popular, and through a nationwide
crusade led by the Visitation and Aid Society, soon spread to
34. Id. at 286.
35. Id. at 287.
36. Id. at 286-87.
37. Id at 284.
38. Id. at 286.
39. Mary Kay Lanthier, Children's Right to Be Heard, 2 NU F.1, 7 (1997).
40. See PLATT, supra note 2, at 104.
41. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
42. Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 1899 Il. Laws 131.
43. Id. §§ 1,2.
44. See BERNARD, supra note 3, at 88.
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jurisdictions throughout the United States. By 1928, all but two
states had established juvenile court systems.45
Before proceeding, it is important to highlight the tension
between the Illinois Supreme Court's concern for preserving the
"natural" affinity between parent and child, 6 and the rhetoric of
the child-savers, who condemned the deficiencies of the urban,
working-class family and insisted that the state serve as the "parent
to every child within its borders." 7 The court's presumption in
Turner is that the home still functioned to discipline the child and
provide the "natural" support necessary for the child's
development into a productive citizen. The child-savers, however,
had lost faith in the ability of the home in the industrial era to
guarantee a child's lawfulness and well-being. As Miriam Van
Waters wrote in her paper honoring the twenty-fifth anniversary of
the founding of the juvenile court:
It is significant that it was in America that the first juvenile court
arose, for from America at about the same time the civilized
world received its first warning that all was not well within that
ancient institution, the home. The first decade of the juvenile
court marks the beginning of the rise of the curve of the broken
home .... "
Concern with the breakdown of the urban American family
pervaded the early literature on the juvenile court."Q Against such
popular anxiety over the capacity of the domestic sphere to
surmount urban, industrial hazards, the Turner court's logic could
not prevail. As Waters indicates, "natural parenthood itself" was
beginning to weaken "at the very time the juvenile court
enunciated the principle of the Parenthood of the State."50
In order to reassert the principle of parens patriae, the juvenile
court had to establish itself as a non-punitive institution-a
paternal, rather than penal, response to the urban crisis of the
broken home. The court had to combine the "father's strong right
arm" with "the mother's gentle influence."51 As T.D. Hurley, the
President of the Visitation and Aid Society of Chicago, wrote, "a
child shall be treated as a child. Instead of reformation, the thought
45. PLATT, supra note 2, at 139.
46. See Turner, 55 Ill. at 285.
47. See HURLEY, supra note 14, at 8.
48. Waters, supra note 8, at 219.
49. See PLAIT, supra note 2, at 31; David S. Tanenhaus, Growing Up Dependent:
Family Preservation in Early Twentieth-Century Chicago, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 547, 554
(2001).
50. Waters, supra note 8, at 220.
51. Mabel Carter Rhoades, A Case Study of Delinquent Boys in the Juvenile Court of
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and idea in the judge's mind should always be formation." 52 In
order to treat the child as a formative being rather than a hardened
criminal, the juvenile court defined itself as a new form of chancery
court rather than a criminal one.53
In order to revive the doctrine of parens patriae, the juvenile
court also had to reconceptualize childhood. Early juvenile court
officials proclaimed that the court "discovered that the child is a
child."54  This discovery occurred within the context of
contemporary theories of adolescence. The theories of G. Stanley
Hall, synthesized in his extensive work Adolescence: Its Psychology
and its Relation to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex,
Crime, Religion, and Education,5 were instrumental in the
"discovery of adolescence" at the end of the nineteenth century.
5 6
Responding to rapid industrialization, urbanization, and
immigration, Hall redefined the meaning of dependency and
delinquency, positing "white middle-class values as normal" and
situating working-class youth, as deviant and dependent on society
for reformation. 7 The ways in which contemporary social scientists
like Hall utilized a proto-eugenic model of social order will be
discussed in Part IV; here, however, it is important to highlight how
changing notions of adolescence allowed the court to assume the
role of parent to urban youth.
Under the revived doctrine of parens patriae, the state (as it
exercised its power through the court) was not seen as the
substitute parent of urban youth, but was actually described as the
original, primary parental authority. The early literature on the
court did not question this authority. As Judge Julian Mack wrote
in his classic article, The Juvenile Court, "the state is the higher or
ultimate parent of all the dependents within its borders.
58
Similarly, Hurley indicated that "the principle feature of the
juvenile court... is to transfer the care and custody of the person
of the child to a. court of original and unlimited jurisdiction."59
52. T.D. Hurley, Development of the Juvenile Court Idea, in INT'L PRISON COMM'N,
supra note 1, at 7, 8. See also Richard Tuthill, History of the Children's Court in Chicago, in
INT'L PRISON COMM'N, supra note 1, at 1, 1 (citing the treatment of a child as a child rather
than a criminal as the "basic principle" of the Juvenile Court Act of 1899).
53. See BERNARD, supra note 3, at 88.
54. See, e.g., Barrows, supra note 24, at ix.
55. G. STANLEY HALL, ADOLESCENCE: ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND ITS RELATION TO
PHYSIOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIOLOGY, SEX, CRIME, RELIGION, AND EDUCATION
(1904).
56. CHRISTINE GRIFFIN, REPRESENTATIONS OF YOUTH: THE STUDY OF YOUTH AND
ADOLESCENCE IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 11 (1993).
57. Id. at 11-15.
58. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 104 (1909).
59. Hurley, supra note 52, at 8-9.
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Helen Rankin Jeter, in her 1922 study of the Chicago juvenile court
system, discusses the court's "original and exclusive jurisdiction"
over "delinquent children [and] dependent or neglected children. '
For such children, she writes, "the jurisdiction is technically
exercised over the child. Actually, however, the entire family is
brought under supervision.""
Whereas working-class parents had to prove their worth to
juvenile judges and parole officers, it was assumed that the judge
was righteous in his parental role and that his authority superceded
the authority of the actual parents in raising their children. As the
first Cook County juvenile court judge announced, "I have always
felt and endeavored to act in each case as I would were it my own
son that was before me in my library at home charged with some
misconduct." 2 Samuel Barrows, the Commissioner for the United
States on the International Prison Commission, asserted that by
1904, "parents, guardians, or teachers have concluded that the
juvenile court could accomplish what they had not been able to
effect themselves."63 The judge essentially became the "good"
father to the city's wayward youth.
This paternalistic philosophy allowed the juvenile courts to deny
procedural protections and retain jurisdiction over children who
had not committed any criminal acts. In the early years of the
juvenile courts, state legislatures and juvenile court judges insisted
that the child offender was not being deprived of any right to
liberty, because she did not have such a right in the first place.
Instead, under the parens patriae doctrine, the juvenile court
"provided the child with the one right to which she was
entitled-the right to custody. '' 64 The majority of youth brought
before the Cook County juvenile court in its earliest years were
summoned for non-criminal, status-based offenses.65 Despite the
formal classification of the juvenile court as a chancery court,
juvenile court judges exercised unlimited discretion to imprison
non-criminal youth.' Status offenders were detained in the same
facilities that were used for juveniles who had committed criminal
acts. 67 No formal procedural protections were established for youth
summoned to the juvenile courts since such protections would
60. HELEN RANKIN JETER, THE CHICAGO JUVENILE COURT 11 (U.S. Dep't of Labor,
Children's Bureau, Bureau Pub. No. 104, 1922).
61. Id. at 12.
62. Tuthill, supra note 52, at 3.
63. Barrows, supra note 24, at xv.
64. Lanthier, supra note 39, at 9.
65. See id.
66. See id.
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impede a judge's ability to act in a child's best interests,68 or rather,
to fulfill his role as the "good father."
Legal critiques of the early juvenile courts have largely been
limited to the fact that procedural due process was denied to
offenders tried in juvenile courts, which continued to operate under
the parens patriae doctrine until the 1960s. At that time, the
juvenile court system was compelled to abandon the parens patriae
doctrine-and the exemptions from procedural due process that
accompanied it-as a result of a series of Supreme Court decisions
beginning with Kent v. United States. 69 The Kent decision held that
juveniles could not be transferred to criminal court without a
hearing, assistance of counsel, and a statement describing the
reasons for transfer." In In re Gault, the Supreme Court conferred
upon juveniles the rights to notice,71 confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses,72  and protection against self-
incrimination.73 The Supreme Court's holding in In re Winship
established a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in juvenile
adjudicatory hearings,74 and Breed v. Jones granted juvenile
offenders protection against double jeopardy.75 This line of cases
initiated a re-examination of the juvenile system's philosophy and
procedure and afforded juveniles most of the constitutional rights
granted to adult offenders. Therefore, critiques made on due
process grounds have largely lost their potency after Kent and its
progeny.
The broad discretion permitted juvenile court judges under the
parens patriae doctrine has also been the subject of much
controversy and condemnation from legal academics. Several
scholars have pointed out that such broad discretion unfairly
introduces subjective considerations and inconsistencies into
judicial proceedings. As Professor Barry Feld writes, "the
individualized justice of a rehabilitative juvenile court fosters
lawlessness and thus detracts from its utility as a court of law ....
Despite statutes and rules, juvenile court judges make discretionary
decisions effectively unconstrained by the rule of law."76 Such
68. See id.
69. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
70. See id. at 554.
71. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1967).
72. Id. at 56.
73. Id. at 55. Gault significantly transformed juvenile court proceedings and is
considered the leading U.S. case dealing with the constitutionality of juvenile courts. See
JOSEPH J. SENNA & LARRY J. SIEGEL, JUVENILE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 270 (1976).
74. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
75. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 537 (1975).
76. Feld, supra note 17, at 91.
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individualized law-making defies what F. A. Hayek has deemed the
"rule of law ideal": "Government in all its actions is bound by rules
fixed and announced beforehand-rules which make it possible to
foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive
powers in given circumstances. ... " However, statutory reforms
in the past several decades, including mandatory transfers to
criminal court based on enumerated criteria"8 and offense-based
sentencing,79 combined with the procedural protections Kent and its
progeny afforded," have largely removed the judge's discretionary
powers. Hence these critiques also lack force in evaluating the
modern juvenile court.
While the paucity of procedural protections and abuses of
judicial discretion evident in early juvenile court cases have been
remedied, even the court's harshest critics typically accept its
underlying rehabilitative aspirations. Contemporary youth
advocates, lamenting the "get tough" strategies juvenile courts
adopted in the latter half of the twentieth century, clamor for a
reinvigoration of these original rehabilitative goals. However, as
will be discussed in Part III, it is precisely this rehabilitative aspect
that led to a more insidious, and never fully remedied, outcome for
the courts. Under the guise of charity and rehabilitation, the
juvenile court constituted an unprecedented expansion of the
state's power to intervene into the private lives of immigrant and
working class families.
III. MAPPING THE CRIMINAL CITY
If the judge acted as the good father in the parens patriae system
resurrected by the juvenile court, the charitable matrons of middle-
class reform movements were the ersatz mothers of Chicago's
77. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 54 (1944), quoted in JOSEPH RAZ,
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210 (1979).
78. See Susan A. Burns, Is Ohio Juvenile Justice Still Serving Its Purpose, 29 AKRON
L. REV. 335, 361-66 (1996) (discussing recent amendments to Ohio's juvenile court law that
restrain the juvenile judge's transfer power); Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice
Systems' Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189, 205-06 (1998) (discussing
recent changes in waiver statutes nationwide that limit judicial discretion to waive
jurisdiction or that automatically exclude certain youths from juvenile court jurisdiction).
79. See Feld, supra note 78, at 223-27 (surveying various offense-based and mandatory
sentencing statutes and finding that nearly half of the states use some type of offense-based
guidelines to regulate judicial sentencing discretion).
80. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Law and the Postmodern Mind: Power Without Parents:
Juvenile Justice in a Postmodern Society, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363, 1424-25 (1995) ("[Tjhe
juvenile court must be defended as a check on the drive to mark youthful offenders as
subjects for punishment and criminalization.... The juvenile court continues to offer
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delinquent children. After succeeding in establishing the juvenile
court system, these "child-saving" women became the agents of
surveillance who investigated the conditions under which
delinquent children lived. These reformers effectively mapped out
the "criminal city" in their zealous attempts to create order in the
industrial urban landscape.
Virtually all of the literature produced at the time recognized the
central role women played in the passage of the 1899 Juvenile
Court Act and its subsequent implementation.82 The Juvenile Court
Committee, which lobbied successfully for the passage of the Act,
was led by legendary female reformers Jane Addams and Julia
Lanthrop, and its membership was comprised primarily of upper-
middle-class women from the Hull House social settlement and the
Chicago Women's Club. 3 An article in the Charities Review in
1899 commented on the "women's clubs taking a prominent
role... in the movement under way on behalf of the delinquents."'
The protection of youth was widely considered a feminine
domain, and many bourgeois women eagerly embraced their role as
moral defenders of the city's dispossessed youth. In the early years
of the court, the state did not fund probation officers and relied
instead on the female reformers who led the juvenile court
movement to serve this function. 5 The women who volunteered as
probation officers were given the responsibility of enabling the
court to "maintain its hold upon the children"86 and they were
considered "the cord upon which all the pearls of the Juvenile
Court are strung."87
The role of middle-class women in facilitating the administration
of the juvenile court was not limited to these positions of volunteer
probation officers. Within days after the passage of the Juvenile
Court Act, "requests for copies of the law began to pour in from all
directions. '88 A widely-distributed booklet produced by the
Visitation and Aid Society included blank forms and user-friendly
instructions for filing court papers,89 and the Juvenile Court Act
provided that any "reputable person" who has "knowledge of child
82. See CLAPP, supra note 6, at 41-43, 72-73.
83. See Michael Willrich, The Two Percent Solution: Eugenic Jurisprudence and the
Socialization of American Law, 1900-1930, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 63,78 (1998).
84. Carl Kelsey, Proposed Child Legislation in Illinois, CHARITIES REV., Jan. 1899, at
511,513.
85. See CLAPP, supra note 6, at 171.
86. Carl Kelsey, The Juvenile Court of Chicago and Its Work, 17 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & Soc. SCI. 298,301 (1901).
87. HURLEY, supra note 14, at 14.
88. Hurley, supra note 52, at 7.
89. See HURLEY, supra note 14, at 75-100.
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in his county who appears to be either neglected, dependent or
delinquent" can file a petition that set in motion court
proceedings.' (See Figure 2). The Juvenile Protective Association
(JPA), a "voluntary committee supplementing the work of a public
court" comprised almost entirely of "public-spirited women,"9
divided the city into fourteen districts and assigned each a
privately-funded officer to "safeguard and protect the children."92
Commissioner Barrows described these women as the agents of
"watchcare" over the children brought before the court.93 In fact,
Judge Tuthill frequently invited female JPA members to sit on the
bench with him during court proceedings to advise him on
treatment and sentencing decisions.94
Apparently, these women did their job too well. As early as 1911,
the Chicago press criticized the probations officers and female
volunteers for being "child-snatchers" instead of "child-savers,"
triggering an investigation by the County Civil Service Commission
into the more dubious practices employed.95 As a result of this
investigation, the state legislature restructured the appointment
procedures for probation officers and created paid positions that
were filled mostly by men.'
The court system extended and justified extra-legal investigative
power and provided a mechanism through which an emerging
"science" of urban social ecology could obtain valuable "data" on
juvenile delinquency. The court gave reformers "legitimate" access
to working-class homes. The women who worked with the court,
either as probation officers or as members of the affiliated
charitable societies, compiled extensive reports backed by the
authority of the court. Mabel Rhoades, a sociologist at the
University of Chicago, conducted a Case Study of Delinquent Boys
in 1907 that described the court's endeavor to discover scientifically
the causes of delinquency: "The general thesis .... is simply that
the particular abnormal conditions, easily discoverable in each case
and of obviously desocializing tendency, are sufficient to account
90. Illinois Juvenile Court Act, § 4, 1899 I11. Laws 131. See also HURLEY, supra note 14,
at 76; Kelsey, supra note 86, at 300; Rendelman, supra note 25, at 94.
91. BOWEN, supra note 9, at xii.
92. CLAPP, supra note 6, at 187.
93. Barrows, supra note 24, at xii.
94. See CLAPP, supra note 6, at 172.
95. JETER, supra note 60, at 6-7.
96. See id. For the results of the Commission's investigation, see CITIZEN'S
INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE, THE JUVENILE COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS: REPORT
OF A COMMITTEE APPOINTED UNDER RESOLUTION OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF
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for a great bulk of our juvenile delinquency, leaving the inference
that such conditions, on closer study, account for it all."'97
Rhoades went on to chart the various "data tabulated" and
classify the various neighborhoods of the city according to their
"general character": from "vicious streets" to "poor but decent
streets" to "comfortable streets."98 Similarly, Louise de Koven
Bowen, in her influential book Safeguards for City Youth at Work
and Play, described the Juvenile Court Committee's success in
discovering the "dangerous spots" of Chicago.' New York Juvenile
Court Judge Julius Mayer published a study in 1904 describing
"eight classes" of children "in the large city," which "open[ed] up a
whole range of preventive and educational influences and of
parental and social responsibility as to juvenile delinquency."'"
In 1929, Clifford Shaw, a sociologist at the Institute for Juvenile
Research and Behavior Research Fund, published a study of the
geographic distribution of delinquents processed by the juvenile
court, drawing extensively from the work of probation officers and
court records."°' His book, Delinquency Areas, contains elaborate
maps representing data on several thousand youth brought before
the court in the years 1900-1906, °2 a period during which the court's
probation officers were unpaid and predominantly female."3 (See
Figure 3). Shaw stated that "the study of such problems as juvenile
delinquency necessarily begins with the study of its geographic
location. The first step reveals the areas in which delinquency
occurs most frequently, and therefore marks off the communities
which should be studied intensively for factors related to
delinquent behavior.""' Interestingly, he found that the highest
rates of delinquency are "restricted to the areas more immediate to
the industrial centers"'0 " and concluded that, "with the process of
growth of the city, the invasion of residential communities by
business and industry causes a disintegration of the community as a
unit of social control. ' ' "° These findings relied heavily on the earlier
work of female court officers and volunteers who conducted the
97. Rhoades, supra note 51, at 62.
98. Id. at 71-73.
99. BOWEN, supra note 9, at 4.
100. See Barrows, supra note 24, at xiv.
101. CLIFFORD R. SHAW, DELINQUENCY AREAS: A STUDY OF THE GEOGRAPHIC
DISTRIBUTION OF SCHOOL TRUANTS, JUVENILE DELINQUENTS, AND ADULT OFFENDERS
IN CHICAGO (1929).
102. Id. at 22.
103. Id. at 23.
104. Id. at 10.
105. Id. at 95, 169. 204.
106. Id. at 205.
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"home visits" and interviews that Shaw utilized to flesh out his
data. ' 7
The juvenile court movement, like the women's prison movement
occurring at the same time, was a new avenue through which
"middle-class women gained both valuable personal skills and
greater public authority."'' 8 Through their child-saving enterprises,
middle-class women found new recognition as effective agents of
social change in the public sphere, and in doing so, made great
strides in securing equal citizenship. Bowen attributed the success
of the juvenile court to civic-minded Chicago women and insisted
that "whatever men may believe about the propriety of the vote for
women, those with the ability to see the social changes which are
daily going on about us, are almost in unanimous opinion that it is
highly proper for women to engage in philanthropy.""'°
What often remains unspoken in feminist accounts is the extent
to which the affirmation of middle-class women in the public
sphere happened at the expense of the privacy and domestic
autonomy of working-class women and their families. Unlike the
movement towards greater freedom and equality that Estelle
Freedman associates with late nineteenth-century feminist
struggles,"0 the juvenile court movement allowed the state to
appropriate and constrain the "parental authority" of working-class
and immigrant women, utilizing bourgeois women as a vehicle of
control. Freedman describes how women's prison reformers
"attempted to dismiss class difference and emphasized a common
bond of an innate womanly spirit.'' However, in the literature on
the early juvenile courts, class difference is reinforced, and the
charitable reformers acutely perceived their moral superiority as
women who had the means to maintain a healthy-that is,
nonimmigrant and bourgeois-home. The female-dominated
probation system was the "arm of the state" backing "every person
interested in studying [the] conditions" of poor families."2
Women became the functional arm of the court that went into
the homes of children processed in the juvenile courts, scrupulously
documenting instances of delinquency. They produced elaborate
maps and attempted to link environmental conditions, such as
proximity to industrial sites, to behavioral patterns and
107. See id. at 24.
108. ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, THEIR SISTER'S KEEPERS: WOMEN'S PRISON REFORM IN
AMERICA, 1830-1930, at 47 (1981).
109. BOWEN, supra note 9, at 203.
110. See FREEDMAN, supra note 108.
111. Id. at 33.
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delinquency. As British sociologist John Muncie explains, "the
birth of the concept of 'juvenile delinquency' did not so much
engender a humanitarian attitude towards youthful offenders, as
justify an increased surveillance and regulation of both themselves
and their working-class families."'". This obsessive surveillance and
regulation of working-class households and communities was
extolled as one of the key virtues of the juvenile court. According
to Commissioner Barrows, one of the greatest successes of the
juvenile court was to "reveal the sources of contamination of child
life as they were never revealed before."'"4
Foucault writes that "the delinquent is to be distinguished from
the offender by the fact that it is not so much his act as his life that
is relevant in characterizing him.""' 5 In order to remedy the
problem of juvenile delinquency, the entire life of the delinquent
became part of the court's jurisdiction. Similarly, Sacha Coupet
describes how "[a]t hearings and dispositions, the [juvenile] court
directed its attention first and foremost to the child's character and
lifestyle."".6 No longer confined to weighing the offense (since no
"offense" per se was committed), more diffuse technologies were
required to meet the rehabilitative demands of the juvenile court.
Middle-class women, through their charitable efforts, enabled the
creation of what Foucault describes as the "the carceral network,"
which transports disciplinary mechanisms "from the penal
institution to the entire social body."".7 As Foucault writes, one
critical result of the carceral network is the diffusion of judicial
functions: "The judges of normality are present everywhere. We
are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the
educator-judge, the 'social worker'-judge; it is on them that the
universal reign of the normative is based .. . .""' The child-savers
became an instrument for dislodging the judicial process from the
confines of formal judicial institutions, taking the process of
diagnosing and correcting delinquency to the streets.
IV. SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE: THE ECOLOGY OF DELINQUENCY
Despite the confidence of probation officers and reform-minded
researchers in the juvenile court's ability to discover the causes of
delinquency with scientific precision, no consensus emerged in the
113. JOHN MUNCIE, THE TROUBLE WITH KIDS TODAY: YOUTH AND CRIME IN POST-
WAR BRITAIN 40 (1984).
114. Barrows, supra note 24, at xvi.
115. FOUCAULT, supra note 21, at 251.
116. Coupet, supra note 32, at 1313.
117. FOUCAULT, supra note 21, at 298.
118. Id. at 304.
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literature of the time. As anthropologist Franz Boas presented the
question in The Child, the Clinic, and the Court, "[t]he
fundamental difficulty that besets us is that of differentiating
between what is inherent in bodily structure, and what is acquired
by the cultural medium in which each individual is set, or, to
express it in biological terms, what is determined by hereditary and
what is environmental causes?""' 9
In 1899, the same year as the founding of the Cook County
Juvenile Court, the Charities Review could not resolve this
fundamental question in its article Environment Versus
Heredity?2 ° Twenty-five years later, anthropologists, zoologists,
and juvenile court judges were still debating this question at a
conference commemorating the founding of the juvenile court. 1 '
Ultimately, however, the two sides of the scientific debate about
the origins of delinquency were not as opposed as they might
appear, and both reinforced race and class hierarchy by situating
the white bourgeois norm as "natural" and working-class and
immigrant families as "defective" or "deviant."
Biological and physiological theories that emphasized the
hereditary causes of delinquency more blatantly supported this
hierarchy. In 1876, Italian physician Cesare Lombroso introduced
his famous theories of criminal causation based on evolution and
physical differences discoverable on the body of the criminal.
Lombroso believed that criminals were "atavistic," throwbacks to
"less civilized" evolutionary states, and were therefore more prone
to criminal acts. '22 These "degenerate" characteristics supposedly
manifested themselves in anatomical defects such as "facial
asymmetry." '23 Lombroso's theories were popular among many
American social reformers at the end of the nineteenth century.
"America .. .gave a warm and sympathetic reception to [my]
ideas... which they speedily put into practice with brilliant results
shown by... the Probation System and Juvenile Courts." '24 In
Chicago, his eugenic model was embraced by the white bourgeois
society whose superior status over the great majority of poor
119. Franz Boas, Growth and Development, Bodily and Mental, as Determined by
Hereditary and by Social Environment, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC, AND THE COURT, supra
note 8, at 178,178.
120. Elizabeth Kerr, Environment Versus Heredity, CHARITIES REV., May 1899, at 116.
121. See Boas, supra note 119; C.M. Child, The Individual and Environment from a
Physiological Viewpoint, in THE CHILD, THE CLINIC, AND THE COURT, supra note 8, at 126.
122. Cesare Lombroso, Introduction to Criminal Man, in THE PROBLEM OF
DELINQUENCY 44,46 (Sheldon Glueck ed., 1959).
123. Id.
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immigrants appeared to be scientifically justified.'25 Lombroso's
theories were replicated almost verbatim in studies such as
Rhoades's Case Study of Delinquent Boys, which described how
"head and face anomalies ... show a tendency in favor of the well-
to-do."'26 Similarly, Bowen concluded that about eighty-one percent
of dependent children brought into the juvenile court were "sub-
normal," exhibiting some physical defect.'
Despite the popularity of Lombroso's theories and his claim that
the juvenile court embraced them, progressive reformers largely
spurned physiological accounts, adopting instead "environmental"
theories of delinquency."2 During the late nineteenth century, a
group of social reformers known as the "environmentalists" posited
that social ills had roots in the urban environment.'29 The "positive
environmentalism" movement, which held that improving urban
physical environments would improve social behavior, dominated a
significant segment of the progressive reform community at the
turn of the century.3 ° The popularity of positive environmentalism
led to a broad range of urban reforms, including the widespread
adoption of tenement house regulations and zoning enabling
statutes. 3' However, the child-savers at the JPA and Visitation and
Aid Society, the agencies at the forefront of the juvenile court
movement, most forcefully advanced these environmental
theories.'32 At the center of each of these reforms, even those such
as zoning that were ostensibly geared toward reshaping urban
space, was a concern for the protection of children.' As Professor
Richard Chused notes, between the Civil War and the 1920s, urban
reform efforts "revolved around creating 'positive' environments
for children," and "children became the linchpin of efforts to
125. See BERNARD, supra note 3, at 85; see also Willrich, supra note 83, at 83-93
(discussing the entrenchment of "eugenic jurisprudence" in the early juvenile courts).
126. Rhoades, supra note 51, at 68.
127. BOWEN, supra note 9, at 96.
128. See Kelsey, supra note 84, at 298-99 (describing the juvenile court as indicative of
"a clearer appreciation of the wonderful susceptibility of the child to impressions of all sorts
and a decided reaction from the extreme emphasis laid formerly upon heredity"); Willrich,
supra note 83, at 79 (describing the juvenile court as embracing an "environmentalist" view
of crime and vice).
129. See Willrich, supra note 83, at 71.
130. See PAUL BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820-1920,
at 221-23 (1978) (describing positive environmentalism as a strategy to discourage urban
vice by providing healthy social substitutes).
131. See Richard Chused, Euclid's Historical Imagery, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597,
600-02 (2001).
132. See Willrich, supra note 83, at 71.
133. See Chused, supra note 131, at 612-13 (discussing how zoning reforms were
defended as a lawful exertion of the government's "police power" since they were geared
toward protecting children from the moral risk associated with urban slums).
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reform society."1" Hence, urban youth became the primary vehicle
for environmentalists to articulate positive scientific discourse
relating social behavior to physical conditions in the industrial city.
While hereditary theories of criminality explicitly validated race
and class hierarchy, environmental theories operated in subtler
ways to perpetuate the same social ordering. Environmental
arguments stressed the conditions in which a child was raised;
almost exclusively, this implicated the ethnic background and
socio-economic class of the family. The "broken home" thesis,
originally proposed by Cyril Burt, relied in part on data the
juvenile court produced.135 This thesis was a forerunner to modern
"deprivation theory," which maintains that delinquency arises as a
result of a "deprived" family and cultural background. As Christine
Griffin writes: "'Deprivation' was synonymous in this context with
working-class (or non-white middle class) culture. The cause(s) of
'delinquency' ... could be attributed to such 'deprivation,' which
was then transmitted from generation to generation through
'inadequate' family forms and cultural practices. '
Hence, despite the seeming divergence of these two scientific
theories ("nature" and "nurture") as explanatory models for
juvenile delinquency, the distinction between them in practice was
ambiguous. Under either theory, the working-class and immigrant
family became the breeding ground for delinquency. Reformers
assumed that the dominant bourgeois family structure and the
amenities of a hearth and home were the "normal" and "natural"
structure. They posited the "broken home" as the "abnormal"
response to the "unnatural" city. The child it produced was not
wholly human:
Better than all these [attempts at reforming the delinquent
child] is undoubtedly a good home with two good parents; but
where that is impossible, let us not despair. If the natural prop is
gone, the normal limb removed, we have always to make the
best possible substitute, thankful that.., though the artificial
limb can never be a sound leg, yet with it the patient may get
about to do his share of the great world's work."'
The notion that the degraded environment of the industrial city
corrupted urban youth inspired two popular responses to juvenile
delinquency. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, Charles
Loring Brace and the Children's Aid Society initiated the Urban
134. Id. at 613.
135. CYRIL BURT, THE YOUNG DELINQUENT 11-27 (1925).
136. GRIFFIN, supra note 56, at 105.
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Train Movement to "place-out" at-risk urban youth, taking them
from the city and placing them with families living in rural America
in order to expose them to the "great advantages" of nature.'38 The
goal of the Urban Train Movement was to save children from
delinquency and crime by removing them from the city (conceived
as a dirty, contaminated place) to the countryside (a place of purity
and order).'39 For example, the 1857 Annual Report of the New
York Children's Aid Society describes the benefits of placing-out
with vivid imagery:
The poor vagabond boy, or the child whom misfortune has
made wretched and homeless, goes to a quiet country home....
The poor lad remembering the dirty cellars, and the alleys piled
with garbage and the filthy holes of the great city, wonders with
delight at the orchards and lilacs and the green grass and the
pure air of his new home."4
However, placing-out at-risk urban youth only proved viable for
a limited time.' Since it was not possible to expose enough urban
children to the healing virtues of the countryside, more homegrown
urban solutions were necessary. The juvenile court system sought
to remedy the causes of delinquency within the communities that
allegedly bred delinquents.
The process of rectifying disorder in the industrial city through
the juvenile courts relied heavily on the expertise of social
scientists, who became indispensable to the administration of
justice among newly "socialized" courts.'42 As legal historians have
noted, the Progressive Era was a period in which jurists
reconfigured the relationship between the modern industrialized
state and its citizens.'43 Progressive reformers challenged the
individualistic tenets of the common law and "placed a new
premium on social context and experimentalism."'" Roscoe Pound,
the renowned Harvard Law professor and leading progressive legal
reformer at the time, called this transformation the "socialization of
138. See PLATr, supra note 2, at 65-66; Coupet, supra note 32, at 1311; Martha Grace
Duncan, In Slime and Darkness: The Metaphor of Filth in Criminal Justice, 68 TUL. L. REV.
725, 791-92 (1994).
139. See Duncan, supra note 138, at 791.
140. Id As Professor Duncan points out, "[tjhis passage recalls Dickens's Oliver Twist,
in which Oliver oscillates between a filthy city environment, where he is a captive of Fagin's
thieving gang, and an idyllic country home, where he is, temporarily at least, safe from the
corrupting influence of criminals." Id. at 791 n.336.
141. Coupet, supra note 32, at 1311.
142. See Willrich, supra note 83, at 77-78.
143. See, e.g., id. at 66.
144. Id. at 76.
22
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol15/iss1/4
Greene
the law."'4 5 Critical to this process was the creation of specialized
courts, such as the juvenile court, that relied on a rising class of
professionals-psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers-to
assist in the administration of justice. Pound articulated the goal of
the specialized courts as one of individual classification: "Criminals
must be classified as well as crimes."'" Criminological clinics were
soon created in urban juvenile courts as a "logical outgrowth of
socialized law and its rhetoric of scientific investigation,
professional expertise, and individual treatment."'4 7 Motivated by
new scientific theories of adolescence, wealthy Chicago feminist
and JPA member Ethel Sturges Dummer funded the first court-
affiliated clinic at the Cook County Juvenile Court in 1909.48
White, bourgeois society in Chicago considered it rightfully
within the domain of the juvenile court to diagnose the "nature" of
"defective" urban youth and to correct their disfigurations, caused
either by biology, background, or exposure to unsavory elements.
Unlike the pastoral scene of apple orchards and watermelon
patches invoked by Judge Lindsay that opened this Note, the
ecology of the urban environment bred a different form of
delinquency and demanded that the juvenile court system, acting as
the ersatz parent, cultivate a different order.
V. LESSONS FOR REFORM
Legal scholars often describe the perilous conditions of the early
industrial city as the source of our contemporary systems of zoning
and land use regulation. In his classic work The City in History,
Lewis Mumford observed that "[i]ndustrialism, the main creative
force in the nineteenth century ...produced the most degraded
human environment the world had yet seen."'49 The hazards that
the industrial city created exceeded the capacity of existing
nuisance laws to regulate urban uses and spaces. 5° In response,
zoning laws were created to give order to the chaotic growth of the
city. Underlying these innovations in planning law was the deeply
145. Roscoe Pound, Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARV. L. REV.
302 (1913).
146. Roscoe Pound, CriminalJustice in the American City-A Summary, in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND: REPORTS OF THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY OF THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND, OHIO 559, 586-87 (Roscoe Pound
& Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922), discussed in A.L. Jacoby, The Psychopathic Clinic in
Criminal Court. Its Uses and Possibilities, 7 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 22, 21-25 (1923)
147. Willrich, supra note 83, at 82.
148. Id.
149. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 941 (4th ed. 1998) (quoting
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entrenched ideal of the pastoral home, a rapidly disappearing but
increasingly venerated form.15 1 Contemporary urban planners like
Ebenezer Howard attempted to develop model communities, such
as the "Garden City," in which urban residents could readily access
the healing attributes of the countryside and spatial segregation
immunized children from the corrupting influences of modern
industry.'52
While the effects of the semiotic crisis of the industrial city on
planning law are well documented, the intersection of urbanism
and family law is rarely explored. Nonetheless, I argue that it is
precisely this crisis of meaning that fueled the development of the
juvenile courts. The zoning laws that emerged at the time, while
innovative in many ways, were later subject to critique for
reinforcing racial and class segregation. I argue that the juvenile
courts had a similar effect. Just as zoning laws have been revised to
incorporate changing civil rights norms in the United States, the
juvenile court system must respond to changing privacy and
equality norms.
Several legal academics have criticized the juvenile court's failure
to adapt to changing notions of childhood and criminal culpability.
Most notably, Professor Janet Ainsworth has called for the
dismantling of the juvenile court system due to the transformation
of social understandings of adolescence over the past century:
"Because our interpretive construct of childhood and adolescence
has changed, and we no longer view young people as essentially
and uniformly different from adults, we can no longer justify
maintaining a procedurally and practically inferior justice system
for juveniles ... ."153 Since, we (or rather, the social constructivists
with whom Ainsworth aligns herself) no longer believe in a discrete
category of "juveniles," she argues that the juvenile court as an
autonomous legal system has lost its legitimacy and should
therefore be abolished."
I contend that Ainsworth, in examining the transformations in
our conception of childhood over the past century, has asked only
half the question. Since the juvenile court was invented specifically
to address the problem of urban youth, we must ask also whether
our notions of urbanism have changed. Does the post-industrial city
151. See id. at 942-43.
152. See id. As Dukeminier and Krier note, "[i]t is not surprising that Ebenezer
Howard's Garden City ideal found fertile ground in the United States. From the
beginning ... a strong current projecting pastoral life as the ideal has run through American
culture." Id. at 943.
153. Ainsworth, supra note 17, at 1132.
154. Id.
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resemble the industrial one in a manner that mandates a separate
juvenile justice system? While juvenile courts are no longer a
strictly urban phenomenon, the crisis of the industrial city that
inspired the invention of juvenile justice may help explain the
resiliency of the juvenile courts despite widespread calls for reform
or abolition. Environmental theories translating supposedly
degraded urban environments into juvenile criminality persist in
the popular imagination, even though social scientists have largely
discredited them. As Professor Martha Grace Duncan writes:
[O]ne of the driving assumptions behind the [Urban Train]
Movement remains embedded in our culture: to wit, the
assumption that criminality is natural to the cities and alien to
the suburbs and the country. That we associate criminality with
cities is a commonplace, but this idea is usually thought tb spring
from the actual correlation between high crime rates and urban
concentration. I suggest that the roots of the idea lie deeper,
that criminality and cities are linked by their common
association with filth. If this is so, then our nation's inability to
fight crime effectively may stem partly from a belief that the
affinity between crime and cities is deep-seated and
inexorable.'55
Understanding the relationship between urbanity and juvenile
delinquency as constructed at the birth of the juvenile justice
system may help untangle the reasons why the juvenile court failed
to live up to its progressive aspirations. As recent studies by legal
scholars and sociologists have argued, "place" matters in the
administration of juvenile justice.'56 For instance, Feld and others
have demonstrated that "similarly-situated offenders may be
treated differently based on their locale and that differential
processing is more prevalent in rural settings and declines with
urbanization and bureaucraticization.' 57
Ironically, the paternalistic ideology that characterized the early
urban juvenile courts has survived most readily in rural and
suburban settings, rather than large cities. Feld points out that the
judicial discretion and procedural informality that characterized the
court under the parens patriae doctrine is more prevalent in rural
and suburban juvenile courts than in urban courts.'58 After
155. Duncan, supra note 138, at 792.
156. See, e.g., Simon I. Singer, The Significance of Place in Bringing Juveniles into
Criminal Court, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 643 (1999).
157. Barry C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations in
Juvenile Justice Administration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156, 159 (1991).
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analyzing extensive juvenile court data from the state of Minnesota,
he concludes:
In urban counties, which are more heterogeneous and diverse,
juvenile justice intervention is more formal, bureaucratized, and
due-process oriented. Formality is associated with greater
severity in pre-trial detention and sentencing practices. By
contrast, in more homogeneous and stable rural counties,
juvenile courts are procedurally less formal and sentence youths
more leniently.'59
The logic of the original juvenile court has been inverted over the
course of a century: In the city, stricter formal mechanisms for
maintaining social order (mechanisms that more closely resemble
the criminal court from which the original juvenile courts so
desperately sought to distance themselves) have become
entrenched, while in country, the benevolent, paternal judge seems
to live on.
Meanwhile, academic interpretations of the origins of the
juvenile court have vacillated along with diverse reform agendas
over the past century. In the early 1900s, legal academics applauded
the court's treatment of the "child as a child" as a refined response
to the growing problems of juvenile delinquency and clamored for
its importation into jurisdictions beyond large cities."6 However, by
the late 1960s and early 1970s, when youth advocates were
demanding greater procedural protections for juvenile offenders,
the origins of the court were reread through a more distrustful
lens.'6' The rehabilitative ideal of the Progressive founders of the
juvenile courts came under attack as commentators began to
recognize that "the sensitive paternalism of the juvenile court
movement had an ugly statist face."' 62 Commentators such as
Anthony Platt began to describe how the juvenile court system
gave officials "the power to reach more juveniles and to commit
them in increasing numbers to penal institutions" without providing
even basis due process protections.
163
On a theoretical level, critics condemned the juvenile court for
severing punishment from criminal responsibility. In the post-Nazi
era, the cold war generation -.became increasing wary of such
159. Id. Singer reaches a similar conclusion analyzing data on juvenile courts in New
York State and nationwide. See Singer, supra note 156, at 656-57.
160. See, e.g., Mack, supra note 58.
161. See, e.g., PLATT, supra note 2.
162. Morris B. Hoffman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Neo-Rehabilitationism, and Judicial
Collectivism: The Least Dangerous Branch Becomes Most Dangerous, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
2063, 2078 (2002).
163. PLATT, supra note 2, at 172.
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arbitrary use of state power.' On a practical level, empirical
studies revealed that rehabilitation "simply did not work."'' 5 As
Janet Ainsworth points out, "[d]espite several decades of
experience with rehabilitative penology in the adult and juvenile
systems... criminal recidivism stubbornly refused to whither
away."'66 By the end of the 1970s, the rehabilitative ideal was
replaced with "neo-retributionism, ''6 7 which translated into "a
world in which the juveniles are to be held strictly accountable for
their crimes" through harsh "just desserts" sentencing practices."
The original justification for the juvenile courts, that of "treating
the child as a child," was replaced by a new mantra of "treating
criminals as criminals.,
169
Today, as critics condemn the increasingly punitive functions of
the juvenile court, the rehabilitative roots of the court are once
again being endorsed.7" Contemporary critics long for the return of
the benevolent father to the juvenile court bench. This is a
dangerous trend, which fails to recognize that the rhetoric of
rehabilitation may have been only a strategic response to the
constraints on parens patriae imposed by the Turner decision. Even
more ominously, the rehabilitation model constituted a massive
expansion of the state's power to intrude into the private lives of
immigrant and working-class families. Instead of clamoring for a
return to a dubious past, I would argue for two main principles to
guide reform efforts.
First, reforms must seek to uncouple social control from social
welfare. I agree with Feld when he writes that "the juvenile court's
fundamental flaw is not simply a century-long failure of
implementation, but a failure of conception. The juvenile court's
effort to combine social welfare and criminal social control in one
agency simply ensures that it pursues both missions badly.' 7' As
early as 1971, the American Friends Service Committee recognized
the dangers of a judicial system in which defendants are
simultaneously treated and punished. In its influential report on
American penology, the Committee wrote: "When we punish the
person and simultaneously try to treat him, we hurt the individual
164. See Hoffman, supra note 162, at 2079.
165. Id.
166. Ainsworth, supra note 17, at 1104.
167. Hoffman, supra note 162, at 2081.
168. Ainsworth, supra note 17, at 1105.
169. See Elrod, supra note 11, at 170.
170. See, e.g., CHARLES H. SHIREMAN & FREDERIC G. REAMER, REHABILITATING
JUVENILE JUSTICE 108-130 (1986); Simon, supra note 81, at 1424-25.
171. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court-Part II Race and the




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2003
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 15:135
more profoundly and more permanently than if we merely imprison
him for specific length of time.' ' . The fact that these aims do not
cohere is as true today as it was at the turn of the century, when
unwarranted social control was exerted over youthful status
offenders and working-class families under the guise of social
welfare.
As an alternative to the rehabilitation/retribution dichotomy with
which the juvenile court has struggled over the past century, recent
scholars from disparate ideological camps have argued that
contemporary juvenile courts must respond to structural conditions
placing inner-city youth at risk for crime, without replicating the
empty paternalism of the early juvenile courts. Radical
criminologists, such as Preston Elrod, insist that "[n]either
conservative nor liberal juvenile justice policies address the social,
cultural, economic, political, and institutional conditions that both
produce delinquency and block the implementation of innovative
approaches to youth crime."'73 Instead, Elrod argues, juvenile
justice programs should "work to ensure that basic physical needs
such as food, shelter, and clothing are met"; "maintain a healthy
skepticism about the ability of traditional correctional interventions
to reduce delinquency"; and "ensure the protection of juvenile
rights within the system."'74 Similarly, proponents of "restorative
justice" programs emphasize victim-offender mediations,
community service, and an increased role for educational and
vocational programs to promote productive opportunities for
juvenile offenders.'75 Recognizing that there is a lack of educational
resources and social skills development for children growing up in
marginalized urban communities, restorative justice programs seek
to target "the larger social conditions that [give] rise to [juvenile
crime] ... in the first place."'76 Restorative justice prioritizes both
family autonomy and community-based responses to juvenile
justice. If, as this Note argues, the juvenile court constituted an
unprecedented expansion of state power into immigrant and
working-class urban communities, reforms must seek to redress
these violations.
A second goal to guide reform efforts is to re-democratize urban
space by removing the stigma of vice from public streets and places.
This Note suggests a deeper logic was at play in the establishment
172. AM. FRIENDS SERVICE COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 147-48 (1971).
173. Elrod, supra note 11, at 177.
174. Id. at 179.
175. See Coupet, supra note 32, at 1342-43.
176. BERNARD, supra note 3, at 186.
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of the juvenile courts; namely, when urban youth go out into the
street, they expose themselves not only to vice, but also to the
jurisdiction of the court (and its agents of "watchcare"), thereby
risking discipline and, potentially, legal commitment. This
decidedly undemocratic notion disproportionately impacts low-
income urban households, whose children were more likely to
spend time "in the street" as a result of residential overcrowding
and exclusion from private social institutions. It is also hostile to
the use of public space as a legitimate form of social interaction.'
Although not always explicitly linked to juvenile courts, the trend
in juvenile justice has been to restrict the access of urban youth to
public spaces through citywide curfews,'78 anti-loitering laws that
give police broad discretion to order suspect youth to disperse,'79
and ordinances that broadly define "gangs" as any gathering of
three of more youth that includes at least one with a criminal
record.' Public housing and its surroundings, in particular, have
become the locus of the most intensive youth criminalization
efforts in recent years.'8' As many scholars have argued, such
177. Cf Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994) ("If individuals and groups are to determine their
own destiny-the ultimate promise of democracy--they must control the spaces in which
they live and interact.").
178. See, e.g., Note, Juvenile Curfews and Gang Violence: Exiled on Main Street, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1993) (situating youth curfews as a community response to the
problems of gang violence and summarizing the ongoing policy debate regarding the
effectiveness of curfews); see also MIKE DAVIS, CITY OF QUARTZ 284-89 (1992) (describing
the use of curfews and "virtually unlimited police discretion" to arrest inner city youth in
Los Angeles).
179. See. e.g., Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (invalidating Chicago's Gang
Congregation Ordinance since "it affords too much discretion to police and too little notice
to citizens who wish to use the public streets").
180. See, e.g., California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, CAL.
PENAL CODE § 186.20 (West 1995) (defining a gang as "any ongoing organization,
association or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of
its primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated, having
a common name or common identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or
collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity"); Georgia
Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, 1992 Ga. Laws 3236 (defining "gangs" as any
public gathering of three of more individuals which includes at least one individual with a
criminal record). See generally DAVIS, supra note 178, at 278-84 (describing City Attorney
James Hahn's unprecedented attempts to criminalize gang members and their families in
Los Angeles); Beth Bjerregaard, The Constitutionality of Anti-Gang Legislation, 21
CAMPBELL L. REV. 31 (1998) (surveying anti-gang ordinances nationwide and applying the
doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth and the related issue of freedom of association to
statutory provisions which criminalize gang participation); Terence R. Boga, Note, Turf
Wars: Street Gangs, Local Governments, and the Battle for Public Space, 29 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 477 (1993) (analyzing the constitutionality of public congregation provisions of
gang abatement laws).
181. See Note, Is It a Crime To Live in Public Housing? A Proposal To the Illinois
General Assembly to Amend the Automatic Transfer Statute, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 855
(1994) (describing the automatic transfer of juveniles to criminal court in cases involving the
sale of drugs near public housing property in Illinois); cf Pratt v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 848
F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (granting an injunction halting police sweeps of public housing
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ordinances should be subjected to heightened scrutiny for their
disproportionate impact on low-income and minority youth, as well
as their infringement on the freedom of association guaranteed by
the First Amendment.' 82
An examination of the origins of juvenile justice can also help
destabilize some of the assumptions underlying the policy of order-
maintenance policing that in recent years has become an
increasingly popular response to urban crime, especially urban
youth crime.1 13 Order-maintenance policing is based on the "broken
windows" theory of deterrence James Q. Wilson and George L.
Kelling first articulated in 1982 in their oft-cited Atlantic Monthly
article, Broken Windows."M Under this theory, minor symptoms of
disorder in a neighborhood, such as broken windows, will escalate
into pervasive crime if left unchecked. The theory suggests that
police can promote order and deter serious criminal activity by
aggressively enforcing laws against minor misdemeanors, such as
public drunkenness, loitering, vandalism, littering, public urination,
panhandling, prostitution, and youth gangs. ' After crime rates
plummeted in major cities such as New York City and Chicago that
had adopted such policies, order-maintenance policing was touted
as the "Holy Grail of the 90's '86 and was soon replicated in cities
across the nation.187
Like the juvenile court, order-maintenance policing emerged in
in Chicago). In Pratt, Judge Andersen seemed to embrace a community-based response to
juvenile violence:
[Tihis Court has faith that parents and grandparents living in and around CHA housing
will reclaim their families and restore to their children self respect and respect for other
human beings. If they do, government efforts will succeed; if they do not, all efforts of
government, whether within or without constitutional restraints, will fail.
Id. at 797.
182. See, e.g., Boga, supra note 180 (advocating strict scrutiny of the public congregation
provisions of gang abatement laws on freedom of association grounds); Note, supra note 181
(advocating strict scrutiny of automatic transfers of juveniles selling drugs in or near public
housing on equal protection grounds). But see Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The
Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1154, 1167-69 (1998) (attacking
strict scrutiny of the "new community policing" techniques as improper judicial second-
guessing).
183. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject. A Critique of the Social
Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 292-95 (1998) (describing the tremendous
popularity of order-maintenance policing).
184. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1982, at 29; see also GEORGE L. KELLING & KATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN
WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES (1996)
(further developing the broken windows thesis).
185. See Harcourt, supra note 183, at 301.
186. Id. at 292 (quoting Robert Jones, The Puzzle Waiting for the New Chief L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 1997, at BI).
187. See Joshua Chaffin, Giuliani Returns to His Trademark Policy on Crime: To the
Surprise of New Yorkers, Their Mayor Has Revived His Crackdown on Petty Offences, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 30, 2000, at 4.
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response to a perceived rise in crime that is described as the
product of decaying, unmanageable urban environments." It
similarly seeks to remedy this urban deterioration by transforming
public spaces into sites of increased surveillance and control. As
Richard Schragger observes:
Order maintenance policing targets street crime and the
indications of street crime--unruliness in public, loitering,
graffiti, abandoned cars. It is less concerned with lawbreaking in
private spaces, and thus, by definition, it is less concerned with
those places in which street disorder is controlled by other
means, such as in suburban neighborhoods. '89
Moreover, like the early juvenile court reformers, proponents of
order-maintenance policing are quick to label youth in the streets
as deviant. The broken windows story, as told by Wilson and
Kelling, evokes familiar, but critically modified, imagery:
A stable neighborhood of families who care for their homes,
mind each other's children, and confidently frown on unwanted
intruders can change, in a few years or even a few months, to an
inhospitable and frightening jungle. A piece of property is
abandoned, weeds grow up, a window is smashed. Adults stop
scolding rowdy children; the children, emboldened, become
more rowdy. Families move out, unattached adults move in.
Teenagers gather in front of the corner store. The merchant asks
them to move; they refuse. Fights occur. Litter
accumulates.... Such an area is vulnerable to criminalinvasion."
Similar to the "city of children" that Jane Addams described,"' the
contemporary urban neighborhood is seen as populated by unruly
youth, dislocated from the home by adults who fail to provide
adequate discipline.
However, unlike the early child-savers who saw urban youth as
victims of disorder in the industrial city, proponents of order-
maintenance policing situate urban youth in the post-industrial city
as the culprits of disorder. As a result of this conceptual shift, as
well the broader rejection of rehabilitative ideals in the juvenile
justice system, order-maintenance policing constructs this category
of youth as "disorderly" in ways that differ importantly from youth
as "delinquent." While order-maintenance policing focuses on
"disorderly" youth as a sort of vanguard for neighborhood decay, it
188. See generally WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE
SPIRAL OF DECAY IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS (1990)
189. Richard C. Schragger, The Limits ofLocalism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 454 (2001).
190. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 184, at 31-32.
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effectively transfers the discretion and enhanced surveillance
techniques of the juvenile court judge and his maternal agents of
"watchcare" to the law enforcement officer. Bernard Harcourt
explains that "[w]hat makes the system work is the availability of
broad criminal laws that allow the police to take someone off the
streets because they look suspicious.... [R]egularity on the streets
rests on irregularity in police practice . ,, ." And while this new
model of policing the "disorderly" heavily relies on discretion, it is
devoid of the elements of "benign" categorization and treatment
that characterized the early juvenile courts. As Harcourt remarks,
the "disorderly" is "not coddled, he is not reformed, he is not part
of the psychotherapeutic project of rehabilitation."'93 Rather, order-
maintenance policing is more closely associated with "a militaristic
method of rectification." 9 ' As a result, while juvenile courts have
become increasingly discredited and bureaucratic under the weight
of burgeoning dockets, law enforcement officers are increasingly
endowed with the discretionary powers seen as necessary to stem
urban disorder. 95
While the movement for order-maintenance policing diverges
from the early juvenile court movement in its emphasis on
punishment rather than rehabilitation, it shares a common
compulsion to remedy urban disorder by disciplining wayward
youth dislocated from the domestic sphere. Without
decontextualizing the ideological climate out of which the juvenile
justice system arose, it should be noted that there are alternative
ways of conceiving of youth and crime that are only recently being
explored. Various theorists of critical criminology are interrogating
the ways in which the juvenile justice system has constructed
"juvenile delinquency" as a category to marginalize young people,
particularly working-class and non-white youth. 96 Under this
framework, many acts of delinquency can be seen as forms of
creative resistance to cultural hegemony. 197 In particular, theorists
192. See Harcourt, supra note 183, at 344-45.
193. Id. at 298.
194. Id. at 356.
195. However, like the zealous volunteers at the Juvenile Protective Association, it
appears that some order-maintaining police officers are doing their job too well. As the
Financial Times recently reported, citizen complaints filed against the police have risen almost
inversely in proportion to the drop in crime in New York City, jumping from about 3600 in
1993 to more than 4800 in 1999. See Chaffin, supra note 187. The broad discretion granted
police under the quality-of-life initiative has also been widely criticized as leading to
disproportionate arrests of immigrants and people of color. See BERNARD HARCOURT,
ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 168-69 (2001).
196. See, e.g., Elrod, supra note 11, 176-79.
197. This notion clearly has its parallels in critical race theory. As Randall Kennedy
points out, there is "a distinctive racial critique of the criminal justice system according
to which the legal order is pervasively infected by a systematic racial bias that nullifies
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of subcultural studies, such as Christine Griffin,'98 John Muncie,"
and Michael Brake,2° challenge the "overwhelmingly negative
stance of researchers operating within the mainstream perspective"
in order to reconstruct a more "positive, supportive" definition of
delinquent youth." l
Perhaps one could argue that the juvenile court system did not
solve the problem of youth delinquency, but rather reinforced the
marginality of urban youth and engendered a legal system in which
resistance to the naturalized norm could only be seen as criminal.
As Howard S. Becker writes, "[t]reating a person as though he
were generally rather than specifically deviant produces a self-
fulfilling prophecy. It sets in motion several mechanisms which
conspire to shape the person in the image people have of him."2'
Bernard Harcourt picks up on this notion of subject formation in
his critique of order maintenance policing when he asks: "But what
if order maintenance policing, instead of merely influencing these
categories of individuals, actually helps shape or create these
categories?""
Although it is impossible to "read back" into history discourses
that are being articulated over a century later, it is clear that the
issues and challenges driving the creation of the juvenile court
continue to confront us. The ongoing criminalization of urban
youth through quality-of-life initiatives, repressive gang ordinances,
and the reinstatement of curfews in many U.S. cities are signs that
its legitimacy." RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 27 (1997). Under
such a critique, criminality is equated with admirable defiance. See id. at 26-27; see
also Regina Austin, "The Black Community, "Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1776-77 (1992) ("[T]here has historically been
a subtle admiration of criminals who are bold and brazen in their defiance of the legal
regime of the external enemy.").
198. GRIFFIN, supra note 56.
199. MUNCIE, supra note 113.
200. MICHAEL BRAKE, COMPARATIVE YOUTH CULTURES: THE SOCIOLOGY OF YOUTH
CULTURE AND SUBCULTURES IN AMERICA, BRITAIN, AND CANADA (1984).
201. GRIFFIN, supra note 56, at 108.
202. HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 34
(1963).
203. Harcourt, supra note 183, at 353. However, it is worth noting that Harcourt does not
adopt Becker's causality. Harcourt points out that "[t]o say that the quality-of-life initiative
shapes the disorderly subject is not to say that it promotes more disorderly conduct by labeling
the individual as disorderly-whether or not that is true." Id. at 365. Rather, he distinguishes
between subject creation theory and labeling theory in his discussion of the norm-producing
functions of order-maintenance policing:
[Slubject creation theory, in contrast to labeling theory, does not necessarily suggest that
the category of the disorderly creates more disorderly behavior on the part of the
disorderly persons. The focus of my deployment of subject creation theory ... is instead
on the apparatuses of punishment and discipline that naturally flow from the category of
the disorderly.
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we still exist in a state of urban crisis. Perhaps a critical
interrogation of the historical moment that produced our juvenile
court system can provide insights into the questions with which we
continue to struggle and a finer understanding of the interplay
between urban youth and contemporary forms of state power and
social control.
34
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol15/iss1/4
Greene
Figure 1. Charitable organizations, such as the Visitation and Aid Society, endorsed the simple
logic the early juvenile courts: "It is wiser and less expensive to save children than to punish
criminals."
source: T.D. HURLEY, JUVENILE COURTS AND WHAT THEY HAVE ACCOMPLISHED, at
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(Juvenile Court Blank No. 2.)
PETITION-DELINQUENT CHILD.
STATE OF ILLINOIS,
.................. COUNTY. s .
IN CIRCUIT COURT OF ............. COUNTY.
''... ........................... erm, 19o.
To the H onorable .........................
Judge of the Circuit Court of ......... County.
Your petitioner ..................* - a reputable person and
resident of said County, respectfully represents unto your Honor
that o ........................ a b ............... born on or
about c ................. I now being within said County, is a
Delinquent Child, in this; that d ...... the said a .............
e ...............................................
and that ............................................ .
Therefore your petitioner humbly prays this Honorable Court to
inquire into the alleged delinquency of said child, and into the
truth of the matters herein contained, in pursuance of the Stat-
ute in such cases made and provided; and to make such orders
in the premises as to this Honorable Court may seem meet and




County of .......... ss.
....................... being duly sworn, says
that d ...... has read the above petition, by g ................
signed, and knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true,
according to the best of h ...... knowledge and belief.
Petitioner.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
................. day of ........... i9o ..
............... ......... r.Clerk.
a Insert the name of the child. Spell accuratel,. b
Insert "boy" or "girl." c Insert date of birth as nearly as known.
d Insert "he" or "she." e Insert one or more facts constituting
delinquency in exact words of Section i of the Statutes, e. g., "has
violated a law of the State, and what law;" or "has violated
a city ordinance, and what ordinance;" or "is incor-
rigible;" or "knowingly associates with thieves, vicious or
immoral persons;" or "is growing up in idleness;" or "know-
ingly patronizes a place where a gaming device is operated."
Then insert particular facts, explaining the cause of delinquency
as stated in the foregoing. f Insert facts as to parentage or
guardianship, accounting fully for each of the parents of said
child; giving address, if living, or, if dead, stating that fact;
also stating reasons as to each of the parents, why he or she is
unable or unfit to care for the child. g Insert "him" or "her."
h Insert "his" or "her."
Figure 2. The Juvenile Court Act of 1899 allowed "[a]ny reputable person ... having
knowledge of a child in his county who appears to be either neglected, dependent or delinquent"
to file a petition, such as this one, which set in motion court proceedings.
source: T.D. HURLEY, JUVENILE COURTS AND WHATTHEY HAVE ACCOMPLISHED85 (2d
ed. 1904)
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Figure 3. Utilizing data drawn from early juvenile court records, social scientists such as
Clifford Shaw developed elaborate maps linking juvenile delinquency to unwholesome features
of the industrial city.
source: CLIFFORD R. SHAW, DELINQUENCY AREAS: A STUDY OF THEGEOGRAPHIC
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